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WILL CALIFORNIA'S SEXUALLY VIOLENT
PREDATORS ACT SURVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
ATTACKS?
I. INTRODUCTION
Christopher Evans Hubbart terrorized young women in
the suburbs of East Los Angeles in the 1970s and 1980s. 1
Hubbart's modus operandi was to surprise women living
alone by breaking into their homes either at night or in the
early morning hours.2 He would threaten his victims, tie
their hands together, and place a pillowcase over their
heads.' He then would forcibly rape, sodomize, and often
times force enemas.4 His probation officer's report quotes
Hubbart admitting he had committed similar acts with
twenty women.5
When the authorities finally caught up with him, Hub-
bart pled guilty to three counts of sodomy and one count of
forcible rape.6 Hubbart was committed to Atascadero State
Hospital in 1973 where he received both individual and group
psychotherapy, in addition to behavioral treatments devel-
oped specifically for sex offenders.7 He was released to out-
patient treatment in November 1979, and raped another
woman on the day of his release.8 He avoided apprehension
and raped at least nine more women over the next two years.9
Hubbart was not readmitted to Atascadero until 1981 when
it had become apparent to his doctor that he had been re-
1. See Joseph M. Bessette, In Pursuit of Criminal Justice, PUB. INTEREST,
Sept. 22, 1997, at 61.
2. See id.; Hubbart v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268, 276 (1997).





8. See Bessette, supra note 1, at 61.
9. id.
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offending." In September 1982, he was convicted of forcible
rape, oral copulation, six counts of false imprisonment and
numerous burglary counts and was sentenced to sixteen
years in state prison." In April 1990, Hubbart was released
on parole. Just three months after his release, he assaulted
a female jogger by running up behind her, grabbing her and
fondling her. 3 Parole was revoked and he was convicted of
false imprisonment and sentenced to five years in prison. 14
For his twenty-four convictions (he was suspected by authori-
ties for many more crimes), Hubbart served a total of four-
teen years behind bars, an average of seven months per
rape. 5
Violent sexual offenders, such as Hubbart, arguably
commit the most heinous crimes in society, and the rate of
recidivism among them is extremely high. 6 While these in-





15. See Bessette, supra note 1, at 61.
16. See Shawn Hubler, "Pillowcase Rapist" Latest Catlayst for Anti-Crime
Drives, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1996, at Al. One Department of Corrections study
showed that 51% of sex offenders paroled in California in 1990 were back in
custody by 1992, 58% of them for sex offenses. Id. Stephen Lally, clinical psy-
chologist at a forensic inpatient program, states that estimates of recidivism(repetition of the crime) among sexual offenders range from 13% to 40%. Ste-
phen Lally, Steel Beds v. Iron Bars: New Laws Muddle How to Handle Sex Of-
fenders, WASH. POST, July 27, 1997, at CO.
A prime example of recidivism among sex offenders is James Porter. On
September 2, 1998, Porter raped a 62 year old woman while being monitored
through an electronic anklet just 12 hours after being released. John M.
Glionna, Inmate Freed, Accused Next day of Rape Crime, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5,
1998. Porter was released by the state Department of Corrections, along with
approximately 134 mentally ill inmates, as a result of C.A. Terhune v. Superior
Court, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 841 (1998). Porter was being held beyond his parole un-
der an administrative regulation, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 §§ 2616(a)(7), 2615(1998), that was found by the First District Court of Appeal to be void because
it permitted an individual's parole to be revoked before he or she is ever even
released into the community. Id. at 843. The court held that the statute was
preempted by other state statutes, such as the Mentally Disordered Offender
Law, see infra note 96, the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, see infra note 96, and
the Sexually Violent Predators Act, see infra Part II. Porter had originally
been held under the Sexually Violent Predators Act, however, there was not
sufficient probable cause under the statute. Terhune, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 844. The
heinous nature of the crimes committed by sex offenders and the high rates of
recidivism among them have forced states to specifically target repeat sex of-
fenders with legislation. See Hubler supra, at Al.
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dividuals recognize the animal nature of their conduct, they
do not feel they are in full control of their impulses.17 It is
clear that they should be removed from society and either in-
carcerated for life or treated." However, under the California
and United States Constitutions, the solution favored by so-
ciety is not always constitutionally sound. Incarcerating an
individual for life for whatever reason society deems proper
may be depriving an individual of their liberty without due
process of law." Furthermore, keeping them confined after
they have served their sentence may violate the Double Jeop-
ardy" and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Constitutions.2' Al-
though violent sexual offenders need specialized treatment,"
such treatment may violate the Equal Protection Clauses.23
These constitutional clauses are essential to the Califor-
nia and United States Constitutions because they assure that
no individual or group of individuals is unfairly treated under
the laws. However, it is a general consensus among society
that sexually violent predators are not worthy of constitu-
tional safeguards because of the repulsive nature of their
crimes."4 Thus, it appears that California legislators are
willing to walk close to the fine line between "constitutional"
and "unconstitutional" in order to protect Californians from
these predators.25
In 1995, the California legislature passed the Sexually
Violent Predators Act (the "Act").26 This Act allows for the
17. See Lally, supra note 16, at CO.
18. See id.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9.
22. See Katherine Seligman, Woman Faces Sex Predator Label, Could Be
First Female Comitted Under State Law, S.F. EXAM., Aug. 1, 1998, at A7. Ac-
cording to Norma Romero, spokeswoman for the state Department of Health,
"[t]reatment is not considered a cure ... but is aimed at controlling behav-
ior... [violent sex offenders] learn the triggers that prompt their behavior and
strategies for avoiding them." See id.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST., art. I, § 7:
24. See Scott Winokur, Will Rapist Return to the City?, S.F. CHRON., Mar.
19, 1996, at A15.
25. See id.
26. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600-6609.3 (West 1998). Two identical
bills were signed in order to pass the Act: Chapter 763, A.B. 888, 1995-1996
Reg. Sess., ch. 763, § 3 (Cal. 1995), and Chapter 762, S.B. 1143, 1995-1996 Reg.
Sess., ch. 762, § 3 (Cal. 1995). See also Matthew E. Farmer, Comment, Crimes:
Sexually Violent Predators, 27 PAC. L.J. 574, 580 (1996). Both pieces of legisla-
tion are identical, however, Chapter 763 originated in the Assembly, while
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civil commitment27 of those who are deemed "sexually violent
predators" upon completion of their sentence28 and keeps
them excluded from society until it is determined that they
are no longer a threat.29 Numerous individuals who have
been civilly committed under the Act are now challenging its
constitutionality." The California Supreme Court has re-
cently granted review to these cases."' Although the legisla-
ture intended to prevent the release of dangerous sexual
predators, 2 the California Supreme Court may find that such
confinement is not a constitutionally appropriate way to deal
with sexually violent predators. Therefore, the legislature
may have to find an alternative method of both excluding
these individuals from society and providing them with
treatment. 8
This comment evaluates the constitutionality of Califor-
nia's Sexually Violent Predator's Act34 and proposes an alter-
native way of dealing with sexually violent predators so that
their constitutional rights are preserved. 5 Part II of this
comment is divided into four sections. First, it provides a de-
Chapter 762 originated in the Senate. See id. Assembly member Rogan, the
author of Chapter 763, and Senator Mountjoy, the author of Chapter 762,
worked together to get the Act passed. Id. Chapter 762 was repealed on Janu-
ary 1, 1998. 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. 17 § 151 (West). However, Chapter 763 re-
mains effective and the repealment of Chapter 762 does "not make any sub-
stantive change in the law." 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. 17 (West).
27. "Civil commitment" refers to the process whereby an individual is judi-
cially committed as a sick person, and not as a criminal. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 6250 (West 1998). Civil Commitment under section 6250 of the Wel-
fare and Institutions Code is distinguished from the incarceration of individuals
under the Penal Code, other laws relating to mentally disordered persons
charged with a crime and the criminally insane. Id.
28. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601 (West. Supp. 1998).
29. Id. § 6609.1.
30. See People v. Putney, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 283 (Ct. App. 1997), rev. granted,
950 P.2d 56 (Cal. Dec. 23, 1997) (No. S065144); People v. Hedge, 65 Cal. Rptr.
2d 693 (Ct. App. 1997), rev. granted, 945 P.2d 780 (Cal. Oct. 29, 1997) (No.
S063954); Hubbart v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268 (Ct. App. 1996), rev.
granted sub nom. Hubbart v. Santa Clara County Superior Court (People), 932
P.2d 755 (Cal. Feb. 26, 1997) (No. S052136); Giarcetti v. Los Angeles County
Superior Court (Rasmuson), 931 P.2d 262 (Cal. Feb. 5, 1997) (No. S057336);
People v. Superior Court (Cain), 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296 (Ct. App. 1996), rev.
granted, 931 P.2d 262 (Cal. Feb. 5, 1997) (No. B 103020).
31. See cases cited supra note 30.
32. See Sexually Violent Predators Act, 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. 763, § 3
(West); see discussion infra Part II.B.
33. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2098 (1997).
34. See discussion infra Part IV.
35. See discussion infra Part V.
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tailed analysis of the Act to facilitate understanding of the
criteria and process by which an individual may be civilly
committed.36 Second, it discusses the Legislature's intent in
passing the Act.37 Third, it discusses cases arising under the
Act 8 and several constitutional issues that the California Su-
preme Court will likely analyze in their decision.39 The con-
stitutional issues discussed include the following: ex post
facto,4" double jeopardy,4 substantive due process4" and equal
protection.43 Finally, it discusses the United States Supreme
Court's approach to a similar statute in Kansas v. Hendricks"'
and looks at how other states have been affected by this deci-
sion.45
Part III of this comment briefly identifies the constitu-
tional problems raised by the passage of the Act, and Part IV
analyzes each of these four constitutional issues individu-
ally."' Finally, Part V presents a proposal for ensuring that
the implementation of the Act is constitutionally sound and
effective in dealing with sexually violent predators. Specifi-
cally, this section proposes that treatment of sex offenders
should begin immediately upon incarceration, and
"conditional release" of sex offenders should be implemented
more often than "unconditional release."47
II. BACKGROUND
A. Definitions, Process, and Procedure Under the Act
According to the Act, the Director of Corrections 48 deter-
mines whether an individual in custody is potentially a
36. See discussion infra Part II.A.
37. See discussion infra Part II.C.
38. See discussion infra Part II.C. 1.
39. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
40. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.a.
41. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.b.
42. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.c.
43. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.d.
44. See discussion infra Part II.D.1.
45. See discussion infra Part II.D.2.
46. The constitutional issues discussed in the Background include the fol-
lowing: ex post facto, double jeopardy, substantive due process, and equal pro-
tection.
47. See discussion infra Part V.
48. The Director of Corrections is the director of The Department of Correc-
tions. CAL. PENAL CODE § 6080 (West 1998); see infra note 34.
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"sexually violent predator" and may refer that individual for
an evaluation at least six months prior to his or her 49 sched-
uled date for release.50 Once the individual is referred for an
evaluation, he or she is subject to screening by the Depart-
ment of Corrections 51 and the Board of Prison Terms. 52 These
entities determine whether an individual is a "sexual violent
predator" by evaluating whether the individual has commit-
ted a sexually violent predatory 53 offense and by reviewing
the individual's social, criminal, and institutional history.54
If, as a result of the screening, it is determined that the indi-
vidual is likely to be a sexually violent predator, the Depart-
ment of Corrections refers the individual to the State De-
partment of Mental Health55 for a full evaluation conducted
by two practicing psychologists or psychiatrists.56 Under
their review, a final determination will be made as to
whether the individual meets the criteria set out in section
49. Charlotte Mae Thrailkill was the first woman to be deemed a sexually
violent predator under the Act. Sex Offender to be Kept in State Hospital, S.F.
CHRON. Sept. 9, 1998, at A20. Thrailkill is 38 years old and was sentenced to
14 years in state prison in 1988 when she plead no contest to lewd and lascivi-
ous acts with five children, between the ages of five and seven. Id.
50. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(a) (West Supp. 1998).
51. "The Department of Corrections meets the need for the provision of fa-
cilities and programs for the control and treatment of convicted felons and nar-
cotic addicts in order to execute the sentences prescribed by the courts and pa-
role boards in this portion of the total criminal justice effort of public
protection." SECRETARY OF STATE BILL JONES, CALIFORNIA ROSTER: DI-
RECTORY OF STATES SERVICES OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 59 (1995).
52. "Members [of the Board of Prison Terms] set the terms for all persons
sentenced to prison for life with a possibility of parole." SECRETARY OF STATE
BILL JONES, CALIFORNIA ROSTER: DIRECTORY OF STATES SERVICES OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 82 (1995). The Board also makes pardon recommenda-
tions to the governor. Id.
53. According to the Act, "predatory" means an act directed toward a
stranger, a person of casual acquaintance with whom no substantial relation-
ship exists, or an individual with whom a relationship has been established or
promoted for the primary purpose of victimization. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 6600(e) (West 1998).
54. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(b) (West 1998).
55. "The Department of Mental Health administers a program of services
for the prevention of mental illness in California. Services are delivered di-
rectly through state hospitals and indirectly through county-administered local
mental health programs .... The Department operates four state hospitals:
Atascadero, Metropolitan, Napa and Patton." SECRETARY OF STATE MARCH
FONG Eu, CALIFORNIA ROSTER: DIRECTORY OF STATES SERVICES OF THE STATE
OF CALIFORNIA 61 (1990).
56. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(d) (West 1998).
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6600 of the Act. 57
Under section 6600, a "sexually violent predator" is a
person who has (1) been convicted of a sexually violent of-
fense, (2) against two or more victims, (3) for which a sen-
tence was received, and (4) who has a diagnosed mental dis-
order that makes the individual a danger to others in
society.58 A "sexually violent offense" is defined in section
6600 as the following acts when committed by force, violence,
duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily
injury on the victim or another person: rape; rape with an
object; lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under the
age of 14; sodomy; and oral copulation.59
In determining whether the individual is a sexually vio-
lent predator, the evaluators will assess diagnosable mental
disorders ° and other factors known to be associated with the
risk of recidivism among sex offenders.6' The "risk factors"
include criminal and psycho-sexual history, type, degree and
duration of the sexual deviance and severity of the mental
disorder.62 If both evaluators agree63 that the individual has a
diagnosed mental disorder that will likely result in sexual
violence without appropriate treatment and custody, the Di-
57. Id.
58. Id. § 6600(a).
59. Id. § 6600(b). The specific Penal Code sections listed in the Act are:
§ 261(a)(2); § 262(a)(1); § 264.1; § 288(a) or (b); § 289(a); or sodomy or oral
copulation in violation of § 286 or § 288(a). Id. However, even if the individual
did not receive a sentence for a prior sexual offense, that act is still to be
deemed a sexually violent offense if there is a prior finding of the following: a
finding of not guilty by reason of insanity of a sexually violent offense; a convic-
tion resulting in a finding that the person was a mentally disordered sex of-
fender; or a conviction in another state for an offense that includes all of the
elements of a sexually violent offense. Id. § 6600(a).
60. According the the Act, a "diagnosed mental disorder" includes a con-
genital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that
predisposes the individual to the commission of criminal sexual acts so that the
individual is a menace to the health and safety of others. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 6600(c) (West 1998); cf. infra note 270 and accompanying text.
61. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(c) (West 1998).
62. Id.
63. If the evaluators do not agree, the Director of Mental Health will ar-
range for further evaluation of the individual by two independent professionals.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(e) (West 1998). These independent profes-
sionals cannot be state government employees, must have five years experience
in the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders, and must be licensed with
doctoral degrees in psychology. Id. § 6601(g). If both independent professionals
agree that the individual meets the criteria, a petition to request commitment
may be filed. Id. § 6601(f).
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rector of Mental Health will forward a request for a petition
for commitment to the designated county under the Act.64 If
the designated county district attorney's office agrees with
the recommendation, a petition for commitment is filed with
the superior court of the county in which the individual was
originally convicted.65
The individual is then entitled to a hearing that requires
a judge of the superior court to review the petition and decide
whether there is probable cause to believe that the individual
is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal be-
havior.66 The individual is entitled to counsel at this hear-
ing67 and is guaranteed all of the constitutional protections
afforded to a criminal defendant.6 If the judge finds that no
probable cause exists, then the petition shall be dismissed.69
If the judge does find that probable cause exists, then the in-
dividual remains in custody and a trial is conducted to de-
termine, beyond a reasonable doubt," whether the individual
is, "by reason of a diagnosed mental disorder, a danger to the
health and safety of others in that the person is likely to en-
gage in acts of sexual violence upon his or her release ....
The individual may choose either a jury or a bench trial. 2
If a jury trial is selected, a unanimous verdict is required." If
the judge or jury determines that the individual is a sexually
violent predator, the individual will be committed to the
State Department of Mental Health for appropriate treat-
ment and confinement in a secure facility for two years."
Upon completion of the two years of treatment and confine-
ment, a petition may be filed pursuant to the Act to repeat
the process."
Once an individual is committed, he or she is entitled to
64. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(c) (West Supp. 1998).
65. Id. § 6601(i).
66. Id. § 6602.
67. Id.
68. Id. § 6603.
69. Id. § 6602.
70. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604 (West 1998).
71. Id. § 6602. Under the Act, "danger to the health and safety of others"
does not require proof of a recent overt act while the individual is in custody.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(d) (West 1998).
72. Id. § 6603(c).
73. Id.
74. Id. § 6604.
75. Id.
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the appointment of an expert and an annual review of all rec-
ords."6 The individual is also entitled to a hearing to deter-
mine whether his or her condition has changed so that he or
she would no longer be a danger to the health and safety of
others upon release.77 If it is so determined, the individual is
entitled to a full trial at which he will be afforded the same
constitutional guarantees as at the initial commitment pro-
ceedings."6 If either a judge or jury finds that the person
should not be released, then the individual shall be confined
for another two years, beginning from the date of the new
ruling.79 If the ruling is in favor of the individual, he or she
will be "unconditionally" released."0 Furthermore, if at any
time during the commitment of an individual the Depart-
ment of Mental Health has reason to believe that the indi-
vidual is no longer a sexually violent predator, it must seek
judicial review of the commitment.8
The individual may petition for a "conditional" release or
the Director of the Department of Health may recommend
such a release." A hearing for conditional release is then
held to determine whether the individual would be a danger
to the health and safety of others if he or she is released un-
der community supervision and treatment. 3 If the court
rules in favor of the individual, he or she is placed on condi-
tional release for one year. At the end of one year, another
hearing is held to determine whether the individual should
be unconditionally released. 4
The Act requires the State Department of Mental
Health, upon the request of a law enforcement official, to
provide information" concerning individuals committed un-
76. Id. § 6605(a).
77. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6005(b), 6005(c) (West. Supp. 1998).
78. Id. §§ 6005(c), 6005(d).
79. Id. § 6005(e).
80. Id.
81. Id. § 6005(f).
82. Id. § 6608.
83. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6608(d) (West. 1998).
84. Id.
85. The Department of Mental Health is permitted to provide the following
information to the law enforcement official: name, address, date of commit-
ment, country from which committed, date of placement in the conditional re-
lease program, fingerprints and a glossy photograph no smaller than three and
one-eighth inches by three and one-eighth inches in size, or clear copies of the
fingerprints and photograph. Id. § 6609.
325
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der the Act.86 Moreover, if the person is going to be uncondi-
tionally released, the State Department of Health must no-
tify county law enforcement of the individual's name, the
community in which that person will reside and whether or
not the individual is required to register with law enforce-
ment.87
While committed, the individual must be given treat-
ment for his or her diagnosed mental disorder, whether or
not it is found that the sexually violent predator is responsive
to treatment. 8  The right to such treatment does not mean
that it must be potentially successful, but that it "shall be
consistent with current institutional standards for the treat-
ment of sex offenders."89
B. Legislative Intent: Rehabilitative or Punitive?
California's Violent Sexual Predator's Act 90 became law
in 1995 as a legislative response to the problem of recidivat-
ing sexually violent predators. 91 In order to be categorized as
"criminally insane" in California, a defendant must have ei-
ther a mental disorder or a developmental disability and be
unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings
against him or unable to aid counsel in his defense. 92 Sexual
predators rarely meet this criteria, yet they may suffer from
"mental disorders,"93 which arguably compel them to commit
sexual assaults. 94 Psychologists agree that repeat sex offend-
ers are not always amenable to treatment and most are un-
likely to change. 95 Nevertheless, the Legislature has chosen
86. Id. § 6609. "Law Enforcement Official" is limited to the chief of police of
a city or the sheriff of a county. Id.
87. Id. § 6609.1(a); see generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1997)
(registration of sex offenders).
88. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6606 (West. 1998).
89. Id. §§ 6606(b), 6606(c).
90. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600-6609.3 (West 1998).
91. See 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. 763, § 3 (West).
92. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1367 (West 1998).
93. See supra note 60.
94. Id.; see Sexual Predators Controversial Statute Does Not Violate Consti-
tution, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 7, 1997, at B6.
95. See Scott Winokur, Will Rapist Return to the City?, S.F. EXAMINER,
Mar. 19, 1996, at A15. Forensic Psychologist Jonathan French, who has done
12 evaluations under the Act, states that this notion is true because sexual ori-
entation is established very early in life. Id. He states, "[w]e don't monitor
sexuality in our kids, and so you're not going to turn around aberrant develop-
ment." Id.
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to attempt to treat sexually violent predators as a separate
group through laws that require their civil commitment. 96
Once their criminal sentences have come to an end,97 sexual
predators targeted by the law are to be treated as sick per-
sons, not as criminals. 98
The intent of the legislature in passing the Act was
clearly explained in 1995:
The Legislature finds and declares that a small but ex-
tremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators that
have diagnosable mental disorders can be identified while
they are incarcerated. These persons are not safe to be at
large and if released represent a danger to the health and
safety of others in that they are likely to engage in acts of
violence. The Legislature further finds and declares that
it is in the interest of society to identify these individuals
prior to the expiration of their terms of imprisonment. It
is the intent of the Legislature that once identified, these
individuals, if found to be likely to commit acts of sexually
violent criminal behavior beyond a reasonable doubt, be
confined and treated until such time that it can be deter-
mined that they no longer present a threat to society.99
The Legislature further explained that it intends for "these
individuals [to] be committed and treated for their disorders
only as long as the disorders persist and not for any punitive
96. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600-6609.3 (West. 1998). The Legislature
has addressed mentally disordered prisoners in two other statutes. In 1969,
the Legislature enacted the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS). CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 5000-569 (West 1998). The LPS permits the involuntary civil
commitment of prisoners who, by reason of a mental disorder, are dangerous to
others or to themselves, or who are gravely disabled. id. § 5001. Examples un-
der the statute are inebriated individuals, id. at § 5170, or those with suicidal
tendencies, id. § 5260. The primary difference between the LPS and the Act is
that the LPS permits involuntary civil commitment for up to 180 days, unless a
jury deems that the person should be further confined for additional treatment.
id.
In 1986, the Legislature enacted the Mentally Disordered Offender Law
(MDO), CAL. PENAL CODE § 2960-2981 (West Supp. 1998), which is similar to
the Act. The MDO was intended to protect the public from prisoners who have
"treatable, severe mental disorder[s] that was one of the causes of, or was an
aggravating factor in the commission of the crime for which they were incarcer-
ated." Id. § 2960. The MDO differs from the Act in that it provides mental
health treatment to paroled prisoners as a condition of their parole, without
confining them beyond their scheduled release. Id. § 2962. The treatment is to
be continued until the mental condition is in remission. Id. § 2968.
97. Id. § 6601.
98. Id. § 6250.
99. 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. 763, § 3 (West).
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C. Constitutional Cases and Issues Arising Under the Act
1. California Cases
The California Constitution is similar to the United
States Constitution in that it guarantees due process,' equal
protection,' prohibits ex post facto laws,' and double jeop-
ardy laws.' °4 Since the Act became effective in January of
1996, several prisoners have moved to dismiss petitions
brought against them under the Act, claiming that it in-
fringes on their constitutional rights. °5
Althor Cain was the first alleged violent sexual predator
to go before a jury in 1996.06 As required under the Act, he
was released to the county where he was last convicted-San
Francisco. ' °7 Along with Cain, nine other prisoners against
whom petitions were filed under the Act moved to dismiss
the petitions, arguing that the Act was an ex post facto law
because it allowed confinement after the completion of their
criminal sentences. '  The superior court agreed with the
prisoners and dismissed the petitions.' 9 However, the First
District Court of Appeals disagreed with the superior court
and concluded that the Act was not an ex post facto law, be-
cause it does prescribe a penal commitment."' This case has
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. V; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST., art. I, § 7.
103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. V; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
105. See cases cited supra note 30.
106. People v. Superior Court (Cain), 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296 (Ct. App. 1996),
rev. granted, 931 P.2d 262 (Cal. Feb. 5, 1997) (No. B103020). Cain is a white
Caucasian male who is currently 53 years old. See Winokur, supra note 24, at
Al. He was "obsessed with Asian women when he was a free man .... He
raped them. . . [and] [g]ot violent with them in other ways too." See id. When
he was arrested in 1990, after an incident that led to his second rape conviction,
the police officers found a book with pictures of 50 Asian women among his be-
longings. Id. He eventually served two terms in state prison, where he will be
remembered for "aberrant behavior," including exposing his genitals. Id.
107. People v. Superior Court (Cain), 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296 (Ct. App. 1996),
rev. granted, 931 P.2d 262 (Cal. Feb. 5, 1997) (No. B 103020).
108. Id. at 297.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 300.
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been granted review by the California Supreme Court.111 The
following year, the same court of appeals also affirmed a
Sonoma County Superior Court decision that rejected a pris-
oner's ex post facto argument.1
2
In 1997, the Superior Court of San Diego County faced
similar cases involving seven prisoners who demurred to the
petition on the grounds that the Act was unconstitutional.1
3
The court agreed with the prisoners and found the Act un-
constitutional "both facially and as applied to defendants." 4
However, these cases were consolidated and the People ap-
pealed in People v. Hedge, where the decision was reversed."5
The Fourth District Court of Appeals also held that the Act
was not a penal statute and, therefore, was not an ex post
facto law."6 The court further held that commitment under
the Act was not punishment; therefore, it did not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause, nor did it violate the Due Process or
Equal Protection Clauses."7 Hedge was also granted review
by the California Supreme Court."8 The counties of Los An-
geles and Santa Clara both have similar cases pending before
the California Supreme Court.
All legislation in California is presumed to be constitu-
tional and may not be struck down without a showing that it
is clearly and unmistakably contrary to the constitution.'
20
Therefore, all doubts are to be resolved in favor of the legisla-
111. Id. at 296.
112. People v. Putney, 67 Cal. Rptr.2d 283 (Ct. App. 1997), rev. granted, 950
P.2d 56 (Cal. Dec. 23, 1997) (No. S065144).
113. See People v. Hedge, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693 (Ct. App. 1997), rev. granted,
945 P.2d 780 (Cal. Oct. 29, 1997) (No. S063954). The following Superior Court
cases were consolidated with Hedge: People v. Donnell (No. D026742); People v.
Badger (No. D026868); People v. Roberge (No. D027104); People v. Blevins (No.
D027221); People v. Crane (No. D027701).
114. Hedge, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 698.
115. Id. at 698, 710.
116. Id. at 706.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 693.
119. See Hubbart v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268 (Ct. App. 1996), rev.
granted sub nom., Hubbart v. Santa Clara County Superior Court (People) 932
P.2d 755, (Cal. Feb. 26, 1997) (No. S052136); see also Garcetti v. Superior Court
(Rasmuson), 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (Ct. App. 1997), rev. granted sub nom., Gar-
cetti v. Los Angeles County Superior Court (Rasmuson), 931 P.2d 262 (Cal. Feb.
5, 1997) (No. S057336) (fifteen petitions consolidated into one case).
120. See People v. Superior Court (Cain), 57 Cal. Rptr. 296, 300 (Ct. App.
1996), rev. granted, 913 P.2d 262 (Cal. Feb. 5, 1997) (No. S057272) (citing Peo-
ple v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 317 (1980)).
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tion. 121 "IT]he presumption of constitutionality accorded to
legislative acts is particularly appropriate when the Legisla-
ture has enacted a statute with the relevant constitutional
prescriptions in mind .... In such a case, the statute repre-
sents a considered legislative judgment as to the appropriate
reach of the constitutional provision."22
2. Constitutional Issues
a. Ex Post Facto
The Ex Post Facto Clause of the California Constitu-
tion123 and the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States
Constitution'24 are interpreted in the same manner.125 The Ex
Post Facto Clauses prohibit the creation of additional pun-
ishment for crimes after such crimes are committed. 126  The
current test for whether a law is ex post facto was set forth in
Collins v. Youngblood,'27 which held that a statue violates the
ex post facto prohibition if it is a criminal or penal law which
makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime after its
commission.12  The focus of the analysis of a burden is on
whether the defendant's punishment is more burdensome,
not just on whether the defendant has suffered any burden. 129
121. Hubbart, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 277 (quoting California Housing Finance
Agency v. Elliot, 551 P.2d 1193, 1204-05 (1976); Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wil-
son, 906 P.2d 1112, 1117 (1995)).
122. Id. (quoting Pacific Legal Found. v. Brown, 624 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1981)
(citations omitted)).
123. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9. The Ex Post Facto Clause reads, "[a] bill of ex
post facto law... may not be passed." Id.
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
125. See People v. McVickers, 840 P.2d 955, 957 (1992); Tapia v. Superior
Court, 807 P.2d 434, 441-43 (1991).
126. See Garcetti v. Superior Court (Rasmuson), 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (Ct.
App. 1997), rev. granted sub nom., Garcetti v. Los Angeles Superior Court
(Rasmuson), 931 P.2d 262 (Cal. Feb. 5 1997) (No. S057336).
127. 497 U.S. 37 (1990) (cited with approval in People v. McVickers, 840 P.2d
955, 957 (1992)).
128. Id. at 42; McVickers, 840 P.2d at 957.
129. Hubbart v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268 (1997), rev. granted sub
nom., Hubbart v. Santa Clara County Superior Court (People), 932 P.2d 755
(Cal. Feb. 26, 1997) (No. S052136) (citing McVickers, 840 P.2d at 957). Prior to
Collins, a string of cases had improperly inquired as to whether the defendant
suffered a "disadvantage" in their ex post facto analysis: Weaver v. Graham,
450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1883);
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 352-53 (1898); But see, California Dept. of
Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506, n.3; Pro-Family Advocates v. Gomez,
1998] SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS ACT 331
Since the Ex Post Facto Clauses apply only to legislation
with a punitive effect or purpose, a primary threshold in an
ex post facto analysis is whether the law is criminal or civil
in nature.3 If the law punishes a person for a past crime it
is considered criminal in nature.' On the other hand, if the
law imposes an involuntary confinement in order to treat a
present sickness, it is considered civil in nature.182 Thus, the
government's motivation is the most important factor.'33
However, a law may be found to be punitive, regardless of an
express legislative intent to the contrary, if the overall design
and effect of the statute is punitive. A person attempting to
disprove the legislature's expressed intent must do so by pro-
viding the "clearest proof' that the statutory scheme is "so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [that] inten-
tion." ' 5 If such an attempt fails, then the expressed goals of
the legislature are controlling.'36
b. Double Jeopardy
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the California Constitu-
tion provides that, "[p]ersons may not be put in jeopardy
twice for the same offense."'37 This clause protects against
multiple punishments for the same offense. 8' If a law does
not constitute "punishment" for a criminal offense, there can
be no double jeopardy violation.1 39  However, a violation of
double jeopardy still may occur when a defendant has already
been punished for a crime and is subject to an additional civil
sanction for the same offense. For example, the second sanc-
tion is unconstitutional if it is found to be only for deterrence
or retribution instead of for a remedial purpose. 40
54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 600, 605 (1996).
130. Hubbart, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 277.
131. Id. at 278.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing United States v. Huss, 7 F.3d 1444, 1447-48 (9th Cir. 1993)).
135. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986) (citing United States v. Ward,
448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
136. See Kennedy v. Mendoza, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
137. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
138. See Hubbart v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268, rev. granted sub
nom., Hubbart v. Santa Clara County Superior Court (People), 932 P.2d 755
(Cal. Feb. 26, 1997) (No. S052136) (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. at
435, 440 (1989)).
139. See id. at 285.
140. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989); see also Montana
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A violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause "can be identi-
fied only by assessing the character of the actual sanctions
imposed on the individual by the ... state."14' In other words,
it is the purpose of the sanctions, not the underlying nature
of the proceeding, that must be evaluated in determining
whether a civil sanction constitutes criminal punishment.42
Under this type of analysis, the labels of "criminal" or "civil"
are not important.'4 ' Therefore, the legislature is not able to
disguise a criminal punishment by expressing its intent to
create a mere "civil" sanction.'4
c. Substantive Due Process
The California and United States Constitutions require
that a person not be deprived of life, liberty or property with-
out due process of the law.1 45 The United States Supreme
Court has held that freedom from personal restraint is a fun-
damental liberty interest.' 46  Substantive due process re-
quires that a governmental restriction on a fundamental
right be examined under strict scrutiny. 147 Therefore, if the
court finds that a state law infringes upon a fundamental
right, it is unconstitutional unless it is found to further a
compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest.' 4' The United States Supreme Court specifi-
cally held in Foucha v. Lousiana141 that an individual may be
committed through civil commitment proceedings, without
offending substantive due process, if the state can prove by
"clear and convincing" evidence that the individual is men-
tally ill and dangerous."'
d. Equal Protection
The California Constitution states, "[a] person may not
be ... denied equal protection of the laws.""' Equal protec-
Dep't. of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
141. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447.
142. Id. at 447 n.7.
143. Id. at 447.
144. See supra Part II.C.
145. U.S. CONST. amend. V; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
146. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987).
147. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
148. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
149. 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
150. Id. at 82.
151. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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tion of the laws is violated if the state adopts a classification
that affects "similarly situated" groups in an unequal man-
ner."' Where the classification does not involve a protected
"fundamental right"5 ' or a "suspect class,"'54 the legislation is
presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classifica-
tion is "rationally related to a legitimate state interest."15 A
legislature that creates a non-protected category of people
does not need to "actually articulate at any time the purpose
or rationale supporting its classification."'56 Instead, such a
classification "must be upheld against equal protection chal-
lenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis for the classification." 7
D. U.S. Supreme Court Decision on Kansas' Sexually Violent
Predators Act
1. Kansas v. Hendricks' 58
Kansas enacted a statute similar to California's Act in
1994, which established procedures for the civil commitment
of persons who, due to a "mental abnormality" or a
"personality disorder," are likely to engage in "predatory acts
of sexual violence."5 9 Kansas legislators passed the statute
in order to commit Leroy Hendricks, a prisoner who had a
152. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985);
In re Eric J., 25 Cal. 3d 522, 530 (1979).
153. Fundamental rights involve the "basic civil rights of man" and, thus, are
subject to strict scrutiny review. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942). Strict scrutiny requires that a law only be upheld if it is "necessary to
achieve a compelling government purpose." See Adarand Constructors v. Pena,
115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). Examples of
fundamental rights are: the right to procreate, see, e.g., Skinner, 316 U.S. 535
(1942); the right to vote, see, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966); access to the judicial process, see, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971); and interstate travel, see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969).
154. Suspect classifications are also subject to strict scrutiny review and in-
clude classifications based on race, ethnicity, and national origin. See Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192
(1964).
155. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993).
156. Id. (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992)).
157. Id. (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313
(1993)).
158. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
159. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 59-29a15 (1994).
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long history of sexually molesting children.6 ° The importance
of preventing Hendricks' release was evident when he stated
that the only sure way he could keep from sexually abusing
children in the future is if he were "to die." 6' Hendricks
challenged his commitment under the Kansas statute on sub-
stantive due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto
grounds.'62
In a five to four decision, the United States Supreme
Court ruled that the Kansas statute was constitutional, with
Justice Thomas writing the opinion of the Court.'63 Hen-
dricks argued that the Kansas statute established criminal
proceedings and, therefore, confinement under it necessarily
constituted punishment.' The Court rejected this argument
and concluded:
The numerous procedural and evidentiary protections af-
forded here demonstrate that the Kansas Legislature has
taken great care to confine only a narrow class of particu-
larly dangerous individuals, and then only after meeting
the strictest procedural standards. That Kansas chose to
afford such procedural protections does not transform a
civil commitment proceeding into a criminal prosecution.16
Further, the Court found that Hendricks' right to due
process was not violated since "civil confinement of a limited
subclass of dangerous persons" does not oppose our current
understanding of "ordered liberty."6 6 Since the court deter-
mined that the Kansas statute is civil in nature, there was no
valid claim based on double jeopardy or ex post facto because
the commitment does not constitute criminal punishment. 67
2. The Impact of Kansas v. Hendricks: States Follow
Supreme Court Decision
Prior to the Hendricks decision, Washington, Arizona,
160. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2076.
161. Id. at 2078.
162. Id.
163. Id.; see generally Harriet Chang, New Ruling on Sexual Predators: They
Can Be Jailed After Serving Term, S.F. CHRON., June 24, 1997, at Al; Joan
Biskupic, Court Gives Leeway in Confining Sex Offenders, WASH. POST, June
24, 1997, Al.
164. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081.
165. Id. at 2083.
166. Id. at 2080.
167. Id. at 2086.
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Minnesota and Wisconsin already had similar laws.'68 The
Wisconsin Legislature passed its sexual predator law in 1994
and currently has 150 individuals imprisoned under that
law. 69  Furthermore, since the Washington Legislature
passed its law in 1990, fifty-one prisoners in that state have
been determined to be sexually violent predators. 7 °
The decision of Hendricks has had an impact on other
states' decisions to pass their own sexual predators laws.'71
The New York Legislature waited for the Supreme Court to
address the issue before it passed its own statute, which be-
came law two days after the Hendricks decision.'72 Legisla-
tures in Hawaii, Illinois, 7 ' Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Nevada and North
Dakota' 4 are currently developing similar statutes following
the Hendricks decision.'7' The Legislatures in New Hamp-
shire and Maine failed to pass sexual predator bills prior to
the Hendricks decision due to constitutional concerns, but
now plan to re-file those bills with more success."'
Furthermore, several state officials have commented that
before the Hendricks decision they were frustrated because
they had to release dangerous sexual predators into society
at the end of their prison sentence.'77 Some believe that it is
inevitable that every state legislature will soon have their
own sexual predator statute as a result of the Hendricks de-
168. See Michelle Boorstein, States Busy with Sex Predator Laws After High




172. Id. New York Senator Dale Yolker, whose name is on the state's sexu-
ally violent predator act, stated, "[u]ntil the Supreme Court decision of the
other day ... we were reluctant to move because we wanted to feel we were on
totally solid ground." Id.
173. The Illinois law is modeled after the Kansas statue and went into effect
January 1, 1998. Terry Burns, Edgar Signs Sexual Predator Bill Into Law: Act
Means Offenders Can be Locked up for Further Treatment, PEORIA J. STAR, July
1, 1997, D7. It is estimated that in any given year, more than 600 sex offenders
are released from Illinois prisons. Id. Under the new law, about 20 of those
offenders could be involuntarily committed for further mental treatment. Id.
174. North Dakota has a sexual predator law which became effective August
1, 1997. This law differs from most in that is allows indefinite confinement,
without conviction, of individuals who are considered to be sexual predators by
police and other criminal experts. Boorstein, supra note 168.




SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
cision.'78
The District of Columbia has dealt with sex offenders
since 1948 with a law entitled the "Sexual Psychopath Act."'79
Under that statute, an individual "who... has evidenced
such a lack of power to control his or her sexual impulses as
to be dangerous to other persons because he or she is likely to
attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or evil on the ob-
jects of his or her desire" is considered to be a sexual psycho-
path.8 ° This statute varies greatly from those of other states
because treatment of sexual offenders occurs prior to and ir-
respective of the outcome of a criminal proceeding. 8' The
confinement may occur before trial, sentencing, or release
and has been justified by the courts as a means of providing
treatment to the offender."2 However, the individual need
not be charged with a crime to be considered a sexual psy-
chopath. 83  The commitment lasts until the person is
"sufficiently recovered" and is no longer dangerous to other
persons.'84 At that time, the offender may be released, tried
for the alleged offense, or if already convicted, serve his or
her sentence.'
Although it appears that many states have followed the
Kansas statute as a guideline following the Hendricks deci-
sion, other state legislatures such as California enacted
similar statutes prior to Hendricks. Furthermore, it does not
appear that the Hendricks decision guarantees constitution-
ality under state constitutions. That is, it does not guarantee
that all state supreme courts will agree with the reasoning in
Hendricks,8 ' because state constitutions may provide greater
protection to individuals than the United States Constitu-
tion.'87 Therefore, states have the option to invalidate their
sexual predator statutes in order to provide greater protec-
178. See Laura LaFay, Fine Print on Crime Has a Few Problems Some Ideas
Are Already Law; Others, Experts Say, Are Just Unworkable, VIRGINIAN-PILOT
STAR, October 30, 1997, at Al.
179. D.C. CODE ANN. tit. 22, §§ 3503-3511 (1996); see also Lally supra note
16.
180. Title 22, § 3503(1).
181. Title 22, § 3503-3511.
182. Id. § 3504.
183. Id. § 3504(a).
184. Id. § 3509.
185. Id.
186. See generally Chang, supra note 163, at Al.
187. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1,2 (1995).
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tion to defendants.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
In California, the punishment for a repeat sexual of-
fender, whose crimes are committed by "force, violence, du-
ress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury
on the victim or another person,"' is confinement in a state
prison for life with an eligibility for parole after twenty-five
years. An individual who has committed one of these hei-
nous crimes is incarcerated, without treatment for twenty-
five years.9 ° California legislators have concluded that these
types of criminals have a very high rate of recidivism.'91
Therefore, the Legislature's means of protecting the public is
the Act, which permits involuntary civil commitment of these
individuals.19
The California Legislature is not unique among the
states in its approach to the problem of repeat violent sexual
offenders.'93 The California Supreme Court has granted re-
view to many cases challenging the constitutionality of the
Act.' Although the United States Supreme Court has up-
held the constitutionality of a similar statute passed by the
Kansas Legislature,' the California Supreme Court will
have to decide for itself whether the Act is valid under the
California Constitution.'96 However, because the California
188. See CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 261(a)(2), 262(a)(1), 264.1, 288(b)(1), 289(a)
(West. 1998) (rape, lewd, and lascivious acts with child under the age of 14, and
penetration by unknown objects).
189. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 667.61 (West 1998). The punishment for a violent
sexual offense without a prior violent sexual offense is confinement in a state
prison for three to nine years. Id. § 264.1 (punishment for violent rape is five,
seven, or nine years); Id. § 286 (punishment for violent sodomy is three, six, or
eight years); Id. § 288 (punishment for violent lewd and lascivious conduct with
a child is three, six or eight years); Id. § 289(e) (punishment for violent penetra-
tion with an unknown object is three, six, or eight years).
190. See codes cited supra note 189.
191. 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. 763, § 3 (West). "These persons are not safe to be
at large and if released represent a danger to the health and safety of others in
that they are likely to engage in acts of sexual violence." Id.; see supra Part
II.B.
192. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600-6609.3 (West 1998). See supra text
accompanying notes 78-88.
193. See supra Part II.D.2.
194. See supra Part II.C.1.
195. See supra Part II.D.1.
196. See cases cited supra note 30.
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Constitution is similar to the United States Constitution, the
Court's analysis may still be similar to that of the United
States Supreme Court in Hendricks.'97 Regardless of the
similarities between the California and the United States
Constitution, the California Supreme Court must look to pre-
vious interpretations of the California Constitution to deter-
mine whether the Act is valid.
A threshold issue for the constitutional analysis is
whether a defendant can be guaranteed constitutional protec-
tions in a non-criminal proceeding.'98 Most of the objections
to the Act involve rights guaranteed to the criminally ac-
cused.'99 Thus, if the Act is found to be exactly what it pro-
claims to be, a civil commitment, it is not likely that a defen-
dant has a valid constitutional objection against the Act.
This comment specifically addresses whether the civil com-
mitment of those deemed to be sexually violent predators un-
der the Act is unconstitutional.
IV. ANALYSIS
A The Sexually Violent Predators Act Prescribes Civil
Commitment and Survives an Ex Post Facto Challenge
A successful constitutional challenge will depend on
whether the Act is considered punitive or rehabilitative in
nature."' Moreover, whether or not the Act is truly a civil
commitment depends on whether the confinement is for a
committed crime or for the treatment of the individual.2 °'
The two primary objectives of criminal punishment are retri-
bution and deterrence. 0 ' Therefore, the Act cannot be con-
sidered punitive unless retribution and deterrence are found
197. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
198. Hubbart v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268, 277 (Ct. App.), rev.
granted sub noma., Hubbart v. Santa Clara County Superior Court (People), 932
P.2d 755 (Cal. Feb. 5, 1997) (No. S052136).
199. For example, in the California Constitution, double jeopardy and due
process pertain to "a defendant in a criminal cause." CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 15;
see also U.S. CONST. amend. 5. In addition, the Ex post facto Clause of both the
California, CAL. CONST., art. 1, § 9, and the United State Consitution, U.S.
CONST., art. 1, § 9, cl. 3, pertain only to penal statutes. See California Dept. of
Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 505 (1995).
200. See supra Part II.C.2.a.
201. See Hubbart, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
202. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082.
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to be its primary objectives."'
The Act does not require the defendant to have a crimi-
nal intent before he or she is committed as a sexually violent
predator.0 4 The Supreme Court in Hendricks found that
"[t]he absence of such a requirement here is [further] evi-
dence that confinement under the statute is not intended to
be retributive.""°5 Similar to the Kansas statute, the Act does
not add culpability for prior criminal conduct.0 6 The prior
criminal conduct is used only for evidentiary purposes to
show that a diagnosed mental disorder or illness exists or to
support a finding that the individual will be dangerous in the
future. ' ' In other words, prior criminal conduct helps to de-
termine whether the individual falls under the class of per-
sons defined by the Act.20 8 Since the Act applies only to those
individuals who suffer from mental disorders that prevent
them from controlling their sexual tendencies, it does not
function as a deterrent. Therefore, confinement under the
Act does not constitute punishment.2 9
The Act clearly states that "potentially successful"
treatment is not required.210 However, the commitment does
not become punitive merely because sexual predators are not
likely to respond to treatment. Circumstances specific to
the individual are irrelevant in determining whether the
commitment should be deemed punishment.212 Regardless of
whether the mental disorder is treatable, mental health
commitments are generally not considered penal, but rather
curative and civil.21'3 Also, the failure to treat a patient does
not render a mental health commitment unconstitutional if
203. Id.
204. See People v. Hedge, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693, 704 (Ct. App. 1997), rev.
granted, 945 P.2d 780 (Cal. Oct. 29, 1997) (No. S063954).




208. Id. at 704.
209. Id.
210. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6606(b) (West. 1998).
211. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
212. See People v. Superior Court (Cain), 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296, 302 (Ct. App.
1996), rev. granted, 931 P.2d 262 (Cal. Feb. 5, 1997) (No. B103020).
213. Id. at 300; see e.g., Conservatorship of Hofferber, 616 P.2d 836, 849-50
(1980); People v. Juarez, 229 Cal. Rptr. 145, 148 (1986); Stickel v. Superior
Court, 186 Cal. Rptr. 560, 561 (1982).
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the confinement is necessary for the protection of others.2 14 If
a predictable response to treatment is required for custody
under a mental health civil commitment, the curable would
be confined while the incurable, who are likely to be the most
dangerous, would have to be released. 2 5 "The right to treat-
ment is not a right to success .... Given the current state of
psychiatry, a mental health commitment cannot be invali-
dated because the person committed may not ever be
cured. 216
Many opponents to the Act state that legislative intent is
masking what is actually a criminal confinement,217 because
it lengthens the period of incarceration for sentences already
served and it operates retrospectively. 2"8 As stated previ-
ously, the fact that the legislature has declared a non-
punitive intent is only one factor in an ex post facto analy-
sis." 9 The "clearest proof' must be shown in order to find
that the Act is so punitive that it negates that intention.
The California Legislature clearly did not act with puni-
tive intent when it passed the Act.22' Legislators stated that
"these individuals [must] be committed and treated for their
disorders only as long as the disorders persist and not for any
punitive purpose."222 In addition, the Act was placed in the
Welfare and Institutions Code instead of the Penal Code. 3
214. Cain, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 302; see Bailey v. Gardebring, 940 F.2d 1150,
1155 (8th Cir. 1991).
215. Cain, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 302.
216. Id. (citing O'conner v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 587-89 (1975)).
217. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2083 (1997) (Hendricks ar-
gued that confinement under the Kansas statute was "disguised punishment").
218. See People v. Putney, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 283, 287 (Ct. App. 1997), rev.
granted, 950 P.2d 56 (Cal. Dec. 23, 1997) (No. S065144). In the Hendricks dis-
sent, Justice Breyer argued:
[T]he Act did not provide Hendricks (or others like him) with any
treatment until after his release date from
prison... [t]hese... features of the Act convince me that it was not
simply an effort to commit Hendricks civilly, but rather an effort to in-
flict further punishment upon him .... The Ex post facto Clause
therefore prohibits the Act's application to Hendricks, who commited
his crimes prior to its enactment.
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2088 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
219. See supra Part II.C.2.a.
220. See supra Part II.C.2.a.
221. See supra Part II.B.
222. See supra note 99.
223. See People v. Hedge, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693, 703 (Ct. App. 1997), rev.
granted, 945 P.2d 780 (Cal. Oct. 29, 1997) (No. S063954).
340 [Vol. 39
1998] SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS ACT 341
Had the Legislature intended the Act to further punish sex-
ual offenders, it would have made more sense to place it in
the Penal Code. Since the Act is in the Welfare and Institu-
tions Code, it was passed to civilly commit specific individu-
als in order to protect the public from harm caused by them.
Although civil labels should not always be determinative in
an ex post facto analysis, the legislature's intent should only
be rejected where the defendant provides the "clearest proof'
that the statute is punitive in purpose or effect such that it
negates the Legislature's intention.
22 4
In Hubbart v. Superior Court, the defendant claimed the
legislative history of the Act disproved non-punitive intent.225
He claimed that the real purpose of the Act is to prevent the
release of sexually violent offenders who have completed
their prison sentences in response to public outcry.226 Thus,
the Act additionally punishes violent sex offenders beyond
the sentences given by the courts.227 However, selected
statements from the legislative history of a statute, which
might reflect a punitive motivation, are not enough to
"overcome the presumption of constitutionality consistent
with the statute's stated purpose."228 The Hubbart court
found that concerns about the danger of releasing violent sex
offenders into the community did not indicate a punitive leg-
islative intent."' Therefore, regardless of the true motivation
behind the civil commitment, the legislature has declared
that this procedure was established so that "these individuals
be committed and treated for their disorders only as long as
the disorders persist,""23 and not for the punitive purpose of
incarcerating them beyond their sentences.2"'
In People v. Cain the court did not agree that the Act was
retroactive in its nature.2 2 In its opinion the court stated,
224. See id. at 700 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (1997)).
225. Hubbart v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268, 277 (Ct. App. 1996),
rev. granted sub nom., Hubbart v. Santa Clara County Superior Court (People),
932 P.2d 755 (Cal. Feb. 26, 1997) (No. S052136).
226. Hubbart, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 278 (quoting 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. 763, § 3
(West)).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 278 (citing State v. Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d 105, 112 n.11 (Wis.
1995); Wiley v. Brown, 824 F.2d 1120, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
229. Hubbart, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 278.
230. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
232. People v. Superior Court (Cain), 57 Cal. Rptr. 296, 300 (Ct. App. 1996),
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"the Act does not retroactively increase the sentence for
[defendants'] original sex offenses: the Act imposes a mental
health commitment for a present diagnosed mental illness
which makes it likely the predator will commit future sexu-
ally violent offenses."23 Furthermore, according to the Act,
the jury cannot impose a civil commitment solely based on
past criminal conduct. 3 4 In upholding a similar statute, the
Washington Supreme Court ruled that "[t]he sexually violent
predator [s]tatute is not concerned with the criminal culpa-
bility of [defendants'] past actions. Instead, it is focused on
treating petitioners for current mental abnormality, and pro-
tecting society from the sexually violent acts associated with
that abnormality."235
The California Supreme Court is likely to find that the
Act is what it purports to be-a civil commitment. Although
it confines individuals who have committed horrendous
criminal acts,236 the purpose of the confinement is to protect
the public and to rehabilitate their sexual disorders. Because
the Legislature did not find that longer sentences would
benefit the public or the convicted individuals, a civil com-
mitment intended to treat the individual is appropriate.
Because it has been determined that the Act involves
civil commitment, and not punishment, it is difficult to find
merit in an ex post facto claim. The Collings v. Youngblood237
test does not apply without a finding that the process consti-
tutes punishment.238 Therefore, there can be no finding that
the Act violates the Ex post facto Clauses of the California
and United States Constitutions.
rev. granted, 931 P.2d 262 (Cal. Feb. 5, 1997) (No. B103020).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 300-01. The statute reads:
Jurors shall be admonished that they may not find a person a sexually
violent predator based on prior offenses absent relevant evidence of a
currently diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to
the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will
engaged in sexually violent criminal behavior.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a) (West 1998) (emphasis added).
235. Cain, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 300 (citing In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 997 (Cal.
1993)).
236. The Act requires that the individual be convicted of a sexually violent
offense against two or more victims. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a) (West
1998).
237. 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 127-29.
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B. A Double Jeopardy Claim Fails Because There Has Been
No Finding of Punishment
It is difficult to argue double jeopardy, multiple punish-
ments for the same offense,239 since the civil commitment does
not constitute "punishment." However, opponents to the Act
point out that some civil penalties have been found to consti-
tute punishment under a double jeopardy analysis 4 ° where
the second sanction could not be characterized as remedial,
but only as a deterrent or retribution.41 Therefore, it is im-
portant to evaluate the character of the burden that the law
imposes on the individual to determine whether the law ac-
tually constitutes punishment!" The previous section ana-
lyzing an ex post facto claim determined that the Act is not
penal in nature by looking beyond the Legislature's stated in-
tent of a non-penal statute.24 This analysis may also be ap-
plied to a double jeopardy claim to conclude that civil com-
mitment under the Act does not constitute a second
punishment.
Although sexually violent offenders remain confined af-
ter their sentences have been served, such confinement is
necessary because they present a serious and continuous
danger to society.244 The Legislature has a legitimate and
remedial purpose of providing a means of treating people
with mental disorders who pose a continuing danger to soci-
ety."' "Although the state must prove prior sexually violent
offenses as a predicate to a... finding [of a sexually violent
predator], the antecedent criminal conduct does not provide
239. See supra Part II.C.2.b.
240. See 'United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989) (finding that a
fine of $130,000 following a criminal conviction sentence for Medicare fraud
violated double jeopardy protections); Montana Dept. of Revenue v. Kurth
Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994) (finding a Drug Tax Act under which a $900,000
fine was imposed on confiscated marijuana in a proceeding separate from
criminal prosecution for possession of marijuana constituted double jeopardy).
241. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989).
242. See supra Part II.C.2.b.
243. See supra Part IV.A.
244. See Hubbart v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268, 286 (Ct. App.
1996), rev. granted sub nom., Hubbart v. Santa Clara County Superior Court
(People), 932 P.2d 755 (Cal. Feb. 26, 1997) (No. S052136); see, e.g., Conservator-
ship of Hofferber, 616 P.2d 836, 844 (1980) ("acts serious enough for criminal
treatment justify a continuing special interest in a person's nonpenal confine-
ment for purposes of public safety").
245. See Hubbart, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 286; see, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
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the basis for a 'second sanction' but is received to show the
person's mental disability and to predict future behavior. 246
Therefore, evaluating prior offenses committed by the indi-
vidual to determine whether he or she suffers from a mental
disorder does not necessarily render the civil commitment an
additional punishment.
The finding of a double jeopardy claim by the California
Supreme Court will largely depend on whether it is found
that commitment under the Act constitutes punishment.
Commitment under the Act only involves treatment until the
offender is no longer a threat to society.2 47 Therefore, it is not
likely that the California Supreme Court will find a violation
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
C. The Act Fulfills All Requirements of Substantive Due
Process
The Act will withstand a substantive due process attack
if it is found to further a compelling state interest and is nar-
rowly tailored to serve that interest.248 California has a com-
pelling interest both in treating mentally disordered sex of-
fenders and in protecting society from their dangerous
behavior.249 Therefore, the first requirement of the substan-
tive due process analysis is satisfied and the focus must turn
to whether the Act is narrowly tailored to serve those inter-
ests .25
In Foucha v. Louisiana25' the United States Supreme
Court held that a Louisiana statute violated due process be-
246. Hubbart, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 286; see e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364,
371 (1986).
247. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6605, 6606(b), 6608 (West 1998).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48.
249. See Hubbart, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 426 (1979)). The Supreme Court has also recognized that an individ-
ual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint may be
overridden even in the civil context:
[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every
person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each
person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly free from re-
straint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is neces-
sarily subject for the common good. On any other basis organized soci-
ety could not exist with safety to its members.
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2079 (1997) (citing Jacobson v. Massa-
chusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905)).
250. See Hubbart, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288.
251. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
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cause it allowed an individual to be held in a psychiatric fa-
cility without a finding that he was both mentally ill and
dangerous. 52 Defendant Hubbart argues that the Act is in-
valid, as is the Louisiana statute, because it allows the state
to commit a person on the basis of a "personality disorder"
that does not rise to the level of mental illness."' Hubbart
argues that a "mental disorder" is similar to a "personality
disorder," which was found to be an insufficient basis for con-
finement in Foucha. 4 The requirement of a "mental disor-
der" as opposed to a mental illness is criticized as a mean-
ingless label used by legislatures to keep sex offenders
incarcerated beyond their sentences.255
Foucha has been misinterpreted and the Illinois statute
is clearly distinguishable from the Act. The statute in
Foucha provided for no particular proof by the state regard-
ing the mental condition to support an involuntary commit-
ment."5 At Terry Foucha's hearing, a doctor testified that he
was in "good shape mentally."257 However, he had an antiso-
cial personality that did not constitute a mental disease and
was not treatable.5 The doctor further testified that Foucha
would be a "danger to himself or to other people." 55 Foucha
was returned to the mental institution based on the doctor's
testimony.26 ° There is a clear difference between the Louisi-
ana statute and the Act. The Act gives the state the highest
252. Id.
253. Hubbart, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288. In People v. Hedge, defendant Mat-
thew Hedge argued that the Act violated due process on its face because it al-
lows for involuntary commitment without proof of mental illness, therefore is
unconstitutional as applied to him because he does not currently suffer from
mental illness. People v. Hedge, 65 Cal. Rptr. 693, 706 (Ct. App. 1997), rev.
granted, 945 P.2d 780 (Cal. Oct. 29, 1997) (No. S06954).
254. Hubbart, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289.
255. See Boorstein supra note 168. Advocates of civil liberties and defense
attorneys see "a dangerous precedent in laws that allow people to be jailed on
the suspicion that they will commit a crime." Id. "They say the Kansas statute
and others like it are panic-driven, unconstitutional reactions to the seemingly
unsolvable problem of sex crime. Keeping people behind bars because of mental
illness is one thing; keeping them under the arbitrary and unscientific term
'mentally abnormal' is another." Id.
256. See Hubbart v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268, 289 (Ct. App.
1996), rev. granted sub nom., Hubbart v. Santa Clara County Superior Court
(People), 932 P.2d 755 (Cal. Feb. 26, 1997) (No. S052136).
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burden of proving that the person has a mental disorder that
makes him or her a danger to others.261 Unlike the Act, the
Louisiana statute did not require any type of burden by the
state.262
In addition, the court of appeals in Hubbart v. Superior
Court stated that a finding that a "mental disorder" is not as
constitutionally adequate as "mental illness" is not supported
by authorities. 6 ' The United States Supreme Court has re-
fused to "enunciate a single definition to describe the mental
condition sufficient for involuntary mental commitment....
The court has used the terms 'mental illness' and 'mental
disorder' interchangeably."26 4  In Hendricks, the Court held
that although a finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is
not a sufficient basis for indefinite involuntary confinement,
if "coupled... with the proof of some additional factor, such
as a 'mental illness' or 'mental abnormality,"' the statute is
adequate.265 In addition, California statutes that provide for
commitment procedures "uniformly regard 'mental disorder'
266as a sufficient constitutional showing.
The term "mental disorder" is not as vague and unscien-
tific as some may argue.267 Diagnoses of "mental disorders"
are made pursuant to the diagnostic terminology and estab-
lished criteria set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders,268 which is prepared by the
261. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604 (West 1998) ("The court or jury shall
determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the person is a sexually violent
predator") (emphasis added).
262. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86. The Court in Foucha required at least a burden
of "clear and convincing evidence." Id.
263. Hubbart v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268, 277 (Ct. App. 1996),
rev. granted sub nom., Hubbart v. Santa Clara County Superior Court (People),
932 P.2d 755 (Cal. Feb. 26, 1997) (No. S052136).
264. Id.; see, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979); United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987).
265. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2080 (1997).
266. See Hubbart, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289, citing CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 5008 (h)(1)(A) (West. 1997) ("mental disorder"); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1026.5(b)(1) (West 1998) ("mental disease, defect or disorder"); CAL.
WELF. & INST CODE § 1800 (West 1998) ("mental or physical deficiency, disor-
der or abnormality"). The Supreme Court in Hendricks noted that they "have
traditionally left to legislators the task of defining terms of a medical nature
that have legal significance." Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081 (citing Jones v.
United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 n.13 (1983)).
267. See Hubbart, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290.
268. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV (4th ed. 1994).
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American Psychiatric Association. Therefore, the term
"mental disorder" has an established and technical mean-
ing.269 A mental disorder is "a clinically significant behavioral
or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an indi-
vidual and that is associated with... a significantly in-
creased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an impor-
tant loss of freedom."2 0
Both defendants Hedge and Hubbart challenged the
component of dangerousness required by the Act because it
can only be proven by a mere likelihood that they may engage
in sexually violent criminal conduct.271 Thus a person can be
determined to be a sexually violent predator based on a pat-
tern of prior sexual crimes absent any present symptoms or
recent conduct. 7' In Hubbart, the court of appeals found that
"there is nothing impermissible about using past conduct as
relevant evidence in evaluating probable future behavior ....
This is 'a constitutionally valid evidentiary consideration."'273
Finally, the plain language of the Act requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the person has a currently diagnosed
mental disorder making him or her a danger to the health
and safety of others.274 Therefore, the Act will survive a con-
stitutional attack under a substantive due process analysis,
because the Act is specifically tailored to assure only those
most likely to engage in violent sexual behavior can be com-
269. See People v. Martin, 107 Cal. App. 3d 714, 724 (1980).
270. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV xxi (4th ed. 1994) (emphasis added).
The DSM-IV further states, "this syndrome or pattern must not be merely an
expectable and culturally sanctioned response to a particular event, for exam-
ple, the death of a loved one .... Whatever its original cause, it must currently
be considered a manifestation of a behavioral, psychological, or biological dys-
function in the individual." Id. at xxi-ii. Mental disorders associated with
sexually violent predators are labeled as "Paraphilias." Id. at 523. Specific
mental disorders include: Frotteurism (rubbing genitals against a non-
consenting person), Id. at 527, Pedophilia (sexual activity with a prepubescent
child), Id., Sexual Sadism (sexual excitement from the physical suffering of a
victim), Id. at 530.
271. People v. Hedge, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693, 708 (Ct. App. 1997), rev. granted,
945 P.2d 780 (Cal. Oct. 29, 1997); Hubbart, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290.
272. Hubbart, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290.
273. Id. at 291 (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 897 (1983); People v.
Superior Court (Dodson), 196 Cal. Rptr. 431, 436 (1983); see also Heller v. Doe
by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 322-24 (1993) ("previous instances of violent behavior are
an important indicator of future violent tendencies").
274. See Hedge, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 708.
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mitted under this provision."' The Act provides a constitu-
tionally sufficient burden of proof and specifically defines
those who may be civilly confined.
D. The Act Does Not Violate Equal Protection
Equal protection is violated if the state adopts a classifi-
cation that affects similarly situated groups in an unequal
manner that is not rationally related to a legitimate state in-
terest.276 Sexual predators claim the Act violates equal pro-
tection because it applies, without justification, a different
civil commitment standard to imprisoned individuals who are
similarly situated to people who have been committed under
California's other civil commitment statutes.277 Their claim is
based on a California statute that defines those individuals
who are "imminently dangerous" and subject to civil com-
mitment.278  This statute states that the individual must
"present a demonstrated danger of inflicting substantial
physical harm upon others."279 It is argued that the Act al-
lows for involuntary commitment based only on a criminal
record and the likelihood of re-offending.28 °
The California Supreme Court has stated that involun-
tary commitment must be supported by a finding of present
dangerousness. 2 1 However, in determining what "degree of
dangerousness" should apply, the court found the distinctions
among the various definitions were "more form than sub-
stance."2 2  A "conclusive presumption of continuing danger-
ousness" based only on past violent felonious conduct would
deny equal protection. 2" However, a finding that the person
is presently a danger to others, is mentally ill and has en-
gaged in qualifying past criminal conduct, satisfies not only a
275. See Hedge, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 708.
276. See supra Part II.C.2.d.
277. See Hedge, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 708.
278. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2962(d)(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
279. Id.
280. See Hubbart v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268, 287 (Ct. App.
1996), rev. granted sub nom., Hubbart v. Santa Clara County Superior Court
(People), 932 P.2d 755 (Cal. Feb. 26, 1997) (No. S052136).
281. See Conservator of Hofferber v. Hofferber, 616 P.2d 836, 847 (1980).
The Court in Hofferber recognized that the confinement of a mentally ill person
on the basis of dangerousness, however defined, is based on "propensities" and
the "possibility" of further acts of violence. id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 177.
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substantive due process challenge, but also "negates an equal
protection violation.""4 That persons near the end of their
sentences and subject to other civil commitment processes
may also be dangerous in varying degrees is irrelevant. 85
"IT]he Legislature is free to recognize degrees of harm, and it
may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where
the need is deemed to be the clearest."286 Furthermore, the
public purpose of the Act is legitimate in that it is designed to
protect society from the dangerous tendencies of sexual
predators, an objective which is appropriate under an equal
protection analysis.87 Therefore, the Act survives an equal
protection attack in that the difference in classifications of
these individuals is outweighed by the danger that these in-
dividuals may cause if released into society.
V. PROPOSAL
Dealing with sexually violent predators is complicated.
On one hand, these individuals are not considered mentally
ill. 88 On the other hand, they "uncontrollably" commit hor-
rendous acts upon members of society. 89 Without a diagnos-
able mental illness, the only basis for confining these indi-
viduals is a violation of the Penal Code, which permits their
release into society after twenty-five years.8 However, a
punishment of twenty-five years in prison is not enough to
deter most sexually violent offenders.2"1 Therefore, some-
thing must be done to prevent predictable future violent sex-
ual assaults on innocent victims. The seriousness of this
problem was appreciated by Leroy Hendricks, when he stated
that the only sure way he could keep from sexually abusing
children in the future is "to die."2 92
Since the current punishment for repeat violent sexual
284. See People v. Hedge, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693, 710 (Ct. App. 1997), rev.
granted, 945 P.2d 780 (Cal. Oct. 29, 1997) (No. S063954).
285. See id.
286. Id. (quoting State of Minnesota v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 275
(1940)).
287. See Hedge, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 710.
288. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(c) (West 1997).
289. See James J. Kilpatrick, Protecting Kids and Putting Away the Preda-
tors, TULSA WORLD, July, 26 1997, at A16.
290. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.61 (West 1998).
291. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
292. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2078 (1997).
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offenders only delays the horrid acts that will eventually be
committed by them, additional action is necessary to prevent
future harm. The California Legislature's approach with the
Sexually Violent Predators Act is rational in that it is de-
signed to treat these individuals and prevent them from be-
ing a further threat to society.293 Although Kansas v. Hen-
dricks94 was a five to four decision, the California Supreme
Court will likely follow the United States Supreme Court and
uphold the Act. However, there is a possibility that the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court may narrowly decide the other way.
However, creating a constitutionally stronger statute would
not stray from the original intention of the legislatures and
would only change the process of dealing with these sexual
offenders.
It appears the reason for delaying treatment to sexually
violent predators is to ensure that the individual is appropri-
ately punished for the heinous crime committed.295 However,
delaying treatment to someone who may not respond to such
treatment confines an individual beyond his or her sentence,
thus creating a fine line between complying with the consti-
tution and additionally punishing the offender. Treatment is
not necessarily a privilege that should be separated from the
punishment. In addition, allowing a jury to decide whether a
repeat violent sexual offender who has served twenty-five
years in prison without treatment is currently a sexually
violent predator is likely to result in additional confinement
regardless of the high burden imposed.296 This is because the
jury is not likely to conclude without substantial evidence
that the individual has been cured of his or her mental disor-
der by sitting in prison for twenty-five years without treat-
ment.297
Therefore, a statute that would treat a sexually violent
predator during his or her confinement would be more suc-
cessful against constitutional attacks than the Act, which
293. 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. 763, § 3 (West).
294. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
295. See id. at 2094 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
296. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6603 (West 1998).
297. This can be concluded from the current attitude of the public towards
repeat sex offenders. David G. Savage and Maura Dolan, Sex Predator Law
Faces High Court Challenge, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1996, at Al. It is unlikely that
the public would be forgiving and permit the release of an individual with a his-
tory of dangerous behavior. Id.
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delays treatment.298 Also, if an individual is treated during
the twenty-five years of confinement,"' a jury would be able
to adequately evaluate whether the individual has made any
progress during his or her confinement. A model for provid-
ing immediate treatment is the District of Columbia's Sexual
Psychopath Act.3"' This statute may not withstand due proc-
ess301 and equal protection0 2 attacks because it allows for the
commitment of sexual psychopaths even without criminal
charges filed against the individual. However, a synthesis
of the California Act and District of Columbia statute would
treat sexual offenders during their punishment for a criminal
conviction and would likely withstand constitutional scru-
tiny.
If the Kansas statute had provided immediate treatment
to Hendricks, it appears that the Hendricks dissent would
not have found an ex post facto violation.3 04 As Justice Breyer
wrote for the dissent, "[t]he Act explicitly defers diagnosis,
evaluation, and commitment proceedings .... Much of the
treatment that Kansas offered here... can be given at the
same time as, and in the same place where, Hendricks serves
his punishment."30 ' He adds, "[t]o find a violation of [the Ex
post facto Clause] here, however, is not to hold that the
Clause prevents Kansas, or other States, from enacting dan-
gerous sexual offender statutes."0 6 Furthermore, if there was
treatment during punishment under the Act, there would be
no valid claim of double jeopardy.0 7
Therefore, in order to ensure that California's Act with-
stands constitutional attacks, it should be amended to treat
individuals while they are confined. This approach would not
be detrimental to society because it would be an attempt to
cure these disturbed individuals. Furthermore, society would
benefit from the release of these sexually violent predators on
298. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2087-99 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
299. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.61 (West 1998).
300. D.C. CODE ANN. tit. 22, §§ 3503-3511 (1996).
301. See supra Part II.C.2.c.
302. See supra Part II.C.2.d.
303. See supra Part II.A.
304. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2093-94 (1997) (Breyer, J., dis-
senting).
305. id.
306. Id. at 2098.
307. See supra Part II.C.2.b.
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a conditional basis only,"°8 for it is important to monitor and
supervise their activities while providing additional treat-
ment in the community." 9 The Act already provides for a
conditional release after one year of treatment,"0 but should
be implemented more frequently than the unconditional re-
lease available under the Act.31' Although conditional release
does not guarantee that the offender will not commit another
offense, unconditionally releasing sex offenders imposes a
greater danger to society because treatment is no longer re-
quired.
VI. CONCLUSION
In passing the Sexually Violent Predators Act, 2 the Cali-
fornia Legislature recognized society's refusal to tolerate the
recidivism of sexually violent predators.33 This comment
supports this legislation by discussing the constitutional
ground on which the Act stands despite the attacks under the
Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy, Due Process, and Equal Pro-
tection Clauses.3"4 The Act does not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause310 because the civil commitment is not a punishment
in disguise.3 6 Punishment involves the goal of either retribu-
tion or deterrence, neither of which is found in the civil com-
mitment prescribed by the Act." 7 Furthermore, without a
finding of a second punishment, a challenge under the Double
Jeopardy Clause will also fail."8
Additionally, the Act does not violate substantive due
process because it satisfies both requirements of constitu-
tionality.3 9 First, the state of California has a compelling in-
terest in both treating sexually violent predators and in pro-
tecting society from their dangerous behavior.320 Second, the
Act is specifically tailored to ensure that only those likely to
308. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6608-6609 (West 1998).
309. See supra note 16.
310. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6608-6609 (West 1998).
311. id. §§ 6608, 6609.1.
312. Id. §§ 6600-6609.3.
313. 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. 763, § 3 (West).
314. See supra Part IV.
315. See supra Part IV.A.
316. See supra Part IV.A.
317. See supra Part IV.A.
318. See supra Part IV.B.
319. See supra Part IV.C.
320. See supra Part IV.C.
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engage in sexually violent predatory behavior may be com-
mitted.321' Finally, the Act does not treat this particular group
of offenders differently than those committed under other
civil commitment procedures, and therefore it passes equal
protection standards.3
There is no guarantee the California Supreme Court will
find the Act constitutional.323 There is a chance that Califor-
nia will interpret these constitutional clauses in a manner
which invalidates the Act.324 Despite this possibility, the
California Legislature will still be able to achieve its goal of
protecting California from sexually violent predators.2 The
current statute ensures that these predators are punished
before being treated, a goal which is reasonable and legiti-
mate.32 6 Nevertheless, if the California Supreme Court finds
the Act is unconstitutional, it is likely that the Legislature
will amend the Act to provide treatment for these offenders
while they are incarcerated.2 Hopefully, with the use of
modern technology and research, treatment of such individu-
als will be more effective,328 and a revised Act will provide an
appropriate method of preventing sexual predators from re-
offending.
Tanya M. Montano
321. See supra Part IV.C.
322. See supra Part IV.D.
323. See supra Part V.
324. See supra Part V.
325. See supra Part V.
326. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601 (West 1998).
327. See supra Part V.
328. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6606(b) (West 1998) (treatment does
not need to be successful or potentially successful).

